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A SEW f.,001\ A 'f /~AR itA RKl.\ 'C
Mark G. S imkin
Abstract

Earmarking has been both praised and denounced as a fi cal
tool of state government, 1 but there appea rs to be little scholarly research to either support or refute the arguments put forth in
the dedication controversy. This paper attempts to weigh the
evidence both for and against special funding, and to suggest
some long-run planning corrections which would serve as a remedy to some specific problems often encountered in t he earmarking process.
Backg round

Earmarking may be defined as the device which ties revenue
from a specific tax, or set of laxe , to the financine of a pa rt icular
governmental function. The practice of earmarking is an old
and common activity in state and local government, a nd was begun in the form of special assessments which local governments
made in financing certain type of improvements to property.
With the pa sage of time, however, a benefits principle of taxation motivated legislators to extend this practice to other func
lions of the state, as for example, in the building of highway ,
the maintenance of professional licensing offices, or the managem<>nl of fish and game departments. In recent years earmarking
ha become extremely wide pread, but the relationship between
the recipients of a governmental service and those who pay the
tax earmarked to finance that service has become inc reasingly
tenuous.
Basically, states have two primary methods of earmarking tax
revenues: a constitutional method and an appr opriations method. In the former. the pr actice is defined in t he state constitution and, usually, specific tax revenues are deposited in pecial
funds from which expenditure appropriations may be made with
out legislative action. As such, little governmental control at
either the executive level or the legislative level is exe rcised. In
the latter case, however, earmarking is practiced by legislative
directive. Receipts of designated taxes are often required to ac
cumulate over some period of time a nd, in such cases, provide
more flexibility in timing expenditu res to needs. In some instances. even t he transfer of surplus earmarked funds is permitted.
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Importance Of tate Earmarked Taxes To
Business And Indi viduals
Despite negative pronounce~ents in e~rl_ier _years, 1 • e,ar
marking has continued to play an important, 1f ironic, part m Lhe
composition of the state budget.. Studies conducted by the Tax
Foundation in 1954 and 1963, which represent the most compre
hensive surveys of earmarked taxes conducted to date, indicate
that t he average proµortion of a state's budget earmarked in
1954 was 51.3% and in 1963, 41.1 %:' However, the rt>lative decline in this ratio is misleading because it is mostly attributable
to the relatively fa ter growth of the tax bases of general fund
revenues and the enactment of nonearmarked taxes, rather than
to the removal of earmarking statutes. In terms of dolh:rs, the
pervasivenes of earmarking is even more striking, total reve
nues having increased from $5.7 billion in 1954 to $9.1 billion in
1963. Finally, one notes that every state in the Union earmarks
taxes and that in 1963, two-fifths of all states earmarked more
than 50% of their total collections, and a fe"" states reached fig
ure of over 80%. Of the uses to which earmarked taxes are put.
by far the mo t common were for high""ays (46 states), local
general purposes (34 states), education (32 states), and welfare
(15 tales).
It is clear that all taxpayers ha'vC an interest in state and local
financing since each is affel'ted by the le\ el, as well as the distri
bution, of the tax burden determined by the municipality. The
fact that individuals and busincss~s do not contribute equall) to
the general tax revenues of the fisc makes the study of car
marked taxes particularly important to both incc taxe'> which
are assessed on a benefits principle obviously shift the tax com
putaUons away from an ability to pay principle and thereby af
feet thi contribution ratio. \\'here one sector 1s behc\ ed to l'S
pecially benefit from a partieular go\ cm mental fun<·tion and is
taxed accordingly. thP dedication prOC<'Ss thu-, ha-, the potential
lo dra.,tically affN·t relative tax burden-. and is con cquently
often a political que;.tion a" well as an t-conom1c one.
A final point r<'garding the 1mportanc<.' of earmarking 1s that
e~rmarking affect;, both the expenditure a well as the re\ enue
side of the ledger. Hence. to the extent that particular busines~
interc-.ts or individual believe that desirable governmental
goods or sen ices will "b<'tter" bt> provided with an earmarked
program than with general funding, the parties have a vital
intere<,t in the earmarking process itself.
T_he purpose of thi paper is to rev ie"" the arguments for and
against earmarking more thoroughly in order to permit a better
understanding of the dedication process as well as to better as
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~ess t~e efficacy o~ earmarking in particular cases. For situations
m which earm arking appears appropriate, this paper also sug.
ge ts certain long-run planning correctives for some of the com.
mon problems often encountered in practice.
Expenditure Allocation And The Welfare Implication
Of The Earmarking Process

At the time of this writing, tax authorities and economists
have not bee~ a~le to agree ~n. the usefulness ~f the earmarking
proces ; and 1t 1s both surprising and paradoxical to find that a
practice of such extensiveness, longstanding debate and, above
all, dollar magnitude has been the subject of so little scholarly
research. This dearth of investigation is perhaps best described
by Sprenkle and Habacivch, who observe, "The literature on
earmarking is notable mainly for it absence. " ll Even the careful
bibliographical research of the prestigious Tax Foundation concludes: "The literature on earmarking is surprisingly sparse. A
careful check of standard references, as well as specialized taxation references, revealed only a few citations over the past decade."·
, ome writers have argued that earmarking leads to a misallocation of funds in that, with a portion of state revenues dedicated
to a particular function, the funded program will overexpand or
become undernourished, depending upon whether the special
fund tax sources yield revenues which are greater than, or less
than, what would have been appropriated within the context of
the general fund .' Similar arguments along these lines are that
earmarking will (1) "tie up" the special fund revenue sources and
thereby overwork the rest; (2) lead to undersupported functions
which might compete more favorably under a general fund arrangement; and (3 ) substitute an indefinite revenue sum based
on vague anticipation of tax collections for a calculated amount
distributed on the basis of need. ~
On the basis of such negative evaluations of the dedication process. standard texts in finance have, until recently, been almost
universal in their condemnation of the earmarking practice. IO
Leonard D. White provides a typical example when he states:
... the net result [of earmarking] is to reduce flexibility in
the use of available funds, to disturb the balance between
different programs, and to limit the authority _of
governors . . . . Earmarking reflects the power of special
interests whose programs may be quite legitimate, and a
distrust of both executive and legislative branches. I I
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Other writers have not been so convinced of the wholesale
removal of the special funding tool of government, as historical
criticism has so forcefully advocated. 12 Among other things,
they have been quick to point out that earmarking detractors
have tended to treat earmarked taxes as an integral and ongoing
part of the state tax system, whereas it has often been the case
that only through the earmarking device that revenues have
been generated, or encouraged, for the supported service. 13
Hence, rather than "divert" state funds from other uses, earmarking may actually generate additional monies for state functions which would otherwise r equire general funds, or perhaps
might not be provided at all. 11
The dedication process has also been cited for its ability to in
spire confidence in the state borrowing and the integrity of its
construction commitments. 15 Fredland and Scott point out, for
example, that: "Relatively weak governments frequently set
aside particular r evenues for debt repayment. If the revenue
source allocation i very certain, even a financially embarra sed
government can borrow additional funds.'" 16
But modern writer have gone further than this in
promulgating the dedication process as a viable tool of state and
local government. Perhaps the best known of such efforts is the
work of James M. Buchanan whose analysis suggests that, to the
extent that general funding doe not permit an item-by item decision on each major expenditure entry. earmarking may in
crea e welfare by ubstituting a normative evaluation of per
sonal choice for the "all or nothing" decision of the general budget. Thu!> the author ugge ts:
The earmarking of revenues must be reexamined in the
context of individual participation in the formation of collec
live decisions. When this approach is taken, it becomes ap
parent that the restrictions that uch practice as ear
marking may impo e on the independence of a budgetary
authority need not produce "inefficiency" in the fiscal pro
ce s. Some such segregation of revenues may provide one
mean of insuring more rational individual choice; under
some conditions earmarking may be a "desirable" rather
than "undesirable" feature of a fiscal structure. 17
Buchanan's most important conclu ion, however, is that gen
era! funding will not only lead to a larger share of the "favored"
\more ela tic ) service, but total spending on both services may
increase beyond the level that would have been reached had the
accounts been segregated . To the extent that this increase in
l?tal spending is paid (consumer su rplus captured) by a collection of individuals who purchase the high level "favored" service
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only so that t hey may obtain an adequate level of less favored
but to them more desirable , services, general funding is ob'.
served to be suboptimal. 1~ For example, the bachelor who might
vote against additional school distrirt taxes (and expenditures)
may vote for additional taxes to finance a bundle of ser vices that
includes education . Hence, in such cases, the practice of earmarking may lead to a more desirable level of expenditures
which is commensurate with the various demands for public
goods.
Charles Goetz c-xtends the B_uch~nan argument by including
not only an endogenous determination of the budgetary mix but
th<' tax strurtur<' with \\ hirh expenditures will be funded as
wC'll. '~ It is demonstrated that, berause of the utility structure
for alternate expenditure levels and tax systems, a "prisoner's
dilemma"' de,elops in which suboptimal strategies dominate.
Under these conditions. it beromes advantageous for some to
r<'nt•ge f:-om a rommitment to the "best"' (highest aggregate utility) tax expenditure packag<'. Thus, Goetz suggests that, in such
im,tances, earmarking provides the ideal "enforcement" tool
with \\ hich to restrict the cho1rc of strategies. for only then will
an optimal consensus be rationally determined . Hence:
Under certain conditions, the only possible budgetary adjustment which yields majority gains may require logrolling
bet ween members of the majority coalition on tax adjustment. General funds budgeting is a suboptimization process
\\ h(•rein incentive to chisel and lack of enforceability render
cooperation between factions unlikely. By contrast, earmarking prm; ides an enforreable "tie in" bet ween the tax
concessions and expenditure concessions necessary to
achieve a majority gain under certain circumstances.
The <'onclusions \\ hieh mav he drawn from these normative
modeb of th<' d(•dication proeess go far to refute t he earlier
crit i<'isms so often exprcssc•d in disapproval of special fund prac
tin·. An 1mmediatP rl'sult is a rationale which may "explain"' why
th(• various statPs continuP to t•armark sizablP proportions of
thc•ir hudg<'ls m the· fac·c• of substantial negative pronouncement.
'.\lore important 1s tht• discovery that earmarking need not uni'-ersall) lead to a· second choice" budgetary allocation: the general wp]fare may be enhanced when (1) earmarking encourages
nePded puhlie programs which would otherw ise suffer, - (2)
whPn an "all or nothing" general fund budget does not accurately rc·flt·<·t an optimal mix of public commodities, or (3) when
earmarking forc·c•s the majority opinion to weight the tax concc·ss1on along with tht• expenditure decision in the overall tax
program. Gcwtz concludes. for example:
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Thus while the consequences of permitting earmarking
are dep~ndent on a host of empirical factors, it is possible to
indirate circumstances where the general funds m1>thod of
adjustment may actually be inf~rior, either_ for a m~Jority of
the group or even by un_an1m1ty. '!,'here 1s cert~inly no a
priori reason for economists to reJect earmarking out of
hand as an ineffi<•ient de" ice within the context of a majori
ty rule decision proct•ss .... Earmarking may even meet the
Paretian welfare criteria if it is evaluated as a lo,1g run pro
ress. 23

The Benefits Doctrine
Most writers have not considered such abstruse theories of
allocative welfare as a justification for earmarking but. rather,
have cited a "benefits" doctrine of taxation. Although then• an•
many b::ses of taxatil)n. including ability to pay. allocation. ethical restraint. sumptuary. or even administrative feasibility, the
benefits principle is most often ad,anced within the earmarking
context because it rests on the presumption that those who re ceive the benefits from the goods or services provided by go, ·
ernment should bear tax burdens in proportion to the amount of
those benefits. Earmarking in this light thus has a distinct aura
of equity.
The benefits principle is not a universal doctrim•: it must al
ways be weighted against other prim·iples of taxation for a given
situation. and its suitability ult:matt-ly decidNI hy individual no
ltons of equity and applit·ahility. Ho" ever, bN·ause earmarking
1s particularlv easv to cna(·t and mav soml•times overcome resistance to nt'\\. or increast,d taxes. this prarti<-t• has demonstrated
a lively potential for political ex?edie111·y. l 'ndoubtedly. ear
marking has gained its Y.Orst reputation from situations in which
the hl•ne[its doctrine has hl'en extended too far, or worse, has
~ot applied at all. Even where exogenous budgetary ('Ontrols are
1mposl.'d. littll.' can he said for special funding whl•n othN princi
pies of taxation gain ascendan(·y. or when no relationship can be
found between thl• revenue sources of earmarked funds and the
expenditure programs by\\ h1t·h they are financed
A furth(•r casl' against the benefits justification has sometimes
been made, however, where earmarked revenues are used to
purchase t·ap1tal goods, such as. for example. the construction of
h1~hways. In such instances, current expenditures are actually
betng made for a discounted stream of future benefits. and hence
the relationship between them is much more complicated than
would at first appear. Among other things. · it becomes ex-
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tremely difficult in many cases to determine who receives how
much benefit and how the tax is to be a rranged so that he who
receives the benefits pays the tax." 25
In the mind of this wr iter, however, this argument goes further in illustrating the difficulty of com puting precise tax burdens under any proposed schema than in discrediting the benefits principle per se. If there is no such thing as the "best" principle of taxation, one can only search for one that, for one reason
or another, seems better than the rest. If welfare is enhanced
through the governmental provision of a good or service which
the general public will not adequately support, but which immediate beneficiarie are willing to finance themselves if given the
opportunity, an earmarked program would clearly appear better
than no program at all.
A final argument against the benefits principle is that it "explains too much," or that the indivisibilities in the public good
produce large "spillover" effects to those who cannot readily be
priced for the benefits they receive. 2" "Thus, the greater the
externality, the less the benefits-received principle applies." 2,
The fundamental error with this logic is the importance attached to an exhaustive "search and capture" of benefits through
tax imposts. It is of course highly likely that everyone who benefits from a specific governmental function cannot be assessed for
the benefits they enjoy in its provision. onetheless, if a primary
group of beneficiaries can be identified, then it does not eem
sufficient to negate the benefits principle just because any rea
sonable tax cannot "cha e" secondary or tertiary beneficiaries.
Stability

It has been noted that earmarking automatically links the expenditure and receipts sides of government budget . i, Henc~,
distrust of the budgetary process in general, or fear of dras~1c
cutback-. m d<>sirable programs in particular, has motivated m
tere'>t groups to press for expenditure plans funded by
earmarked revenues m the hopes that a minimal level of expenditure, as well as a more continuous flow of revenues, would thu
be realized. Along these lines, one authority has concluded: "If
public preference are too fickle to guide suitable levels of exp~nd1ture, then perhaps in periods of declining demand, earmarking
becomes a vital condition for adequate levels of outlay on impor·
tant but minimally popular functions. " 29 Also, to the extent that
fluctuations in s pending patterns may also be reduced, earmarking has sometimes been credited for its capacity to impart
stability to the state's financial system. 30
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Although the dividends from stability in the tax program ~re
well recognized, 3 1 scholars have _found_ some reason to question
h ther earmarking achieves this desirable result. One r eason
~r ethis is t hat the " normal" . c~~e will_ usually admit unequal
evenue and expenditure elast1c1t1es which must eventually lead
~o disparities (or_ so-called "dis_tortion") in the leve_ls ther_nselves.
Further difficulties are found m the facts that (1) mcent1ves and
disincentives to raise earmarked tax rat~s are created_ by
Federal and exogenous state aid to the s pecial fund, (2) adJustments required to increase the co~tri?u tor tax b~rden may
prove inconvenient, (3) notions of equity m_ the al_)port1o_nment of
an increased tax burden may be neglected m the immediate need
to generate greater revenu es, and (4) exante demand f~r the
agency good or service is probably n~t accurat~l_y re_flected m the
provision levels because the expenditure dec1s10n 1s made after
tax receipts are determined instead of the other way around.
As regards the overall question of fund stability, the issue
would appear to present a testable hypothesis. Empirically,
however, there has not been much consensus on a suitable quan titative measure of "stability ," and applicable studies have led to
questionable results. n
Control

Earmarking creates an autonomous spending agency. As such,
some writers have contended that earmarking infringes on the
policy-making powers of the executive, especially in the area of
budgetary control and review. As a result, these critics have argued that earmarked programs will tend to outlive their useful ness because their termination is problematical, 1 that inflexibility is imparted to the revenue structure because a portion of governmental activity has been removed from periodic legislative
appraisal, and that the annexed budgets of special funds may
hide administrative wastes which are not auditable with general
fund a~counting tools. 11 In the strongest form of the argument,
there 1s even the implication that earmarking may be indicative
of non-representative government.
In the opinion of this author, these arguments hide more than
t~ey reveal. Unquestionably, the substitution of fixed appropriations for managerial discretion denies the fisc the flexibility afford_ed the general fund and hence further aggravates the distort1onary characteristic of the dedicatic,n process. However, in
?efense of_ ear_marking, it must also be said that there is nothing
m th~ ~ed1cat1on process which precludes the implementation of
SOl_)h1st1cated accounting procedures in the special agency paralleling those of the ge neral fund. Moreover, even in the context of
the general fund, auditing instruments are more efficient in veri-
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fying expenditure levels, as opposed to devising methods f
setting them, so it is questionable how much real superviso:y
power is afforded by accounting controls in a nd of t hemselves.

A more important form of control may be fou nd when it is
~emembere_d that the legislature still maintains the responsibility for s~ttmg the ra~es of t_he earmarked taxes contributing to
t he special fund. An immediate consequence is t he indirect supervision afforded this governing body over the magnit ude of
the special fund's expenditure program. Then too, it is obvious
that the rel_ative "autonomy" of the earmarked tax agency becomes less insular and more responsive to legislative decision
albeit indirectly. when this control is proper ly exercised:
Finally. this ob ervation further suggests that the "distortion"
often attributed to the earmarking practice may in reality be the
responsibility of the legislature's own reluctance to effectively
deal with the earmarked program's long run commitments. If so,
it would appear that legislative planning, rather than earmarking weakness, is the issue, and this clearly is controllable
through a different set of remedies than a simple alteration in
the fisral organization of the tax structure.
Some Correctives For Earmarking De ficiencies

The primar) condusion is that earmarking is a budgetary tool
whi<'h has been overworked . Where no logical relationship can
be found bet ween tax rontributors and beneficiaries. it is diffi.
cull lo justify earmarking on grounds other than precedence,
expPndiency, or accident. In such cases, a cessation of such practices would appear to he proper, and the greater portion of general-fund earmarking, in which a stated percentage of general
fund receipts are tied to expenditure functions, would be a likely
candidate for such action.
For situations in which a benefits svstem of taxation is applica•
hlP. Parmarking may remain viable. The question of fiscal integrity \\ ithm the sperial fund, as discussed above, might be a_n·
swpred when it is realized that "earmarking" and a "loss of leg1slati\'(' control" are not necessarily synonomou . In particular,
earmarking says nothing about the administrative budget of the
tax agency, which may or may not be funded hy earmarked rev_e·
nu<•s. Of course, even if the administrative budget of the special
agl'n<'y were supported with general funds, this corrective would
still not necessarily result m an optimal expenditure pattern
among beneficiaries. However, it would at least permit the state
government to assume uniform accounting a nd management pro·
cedures and might also be expected to go far in deterring unwar·
ranted management costs in the expenditure p rogra m. Test~ f?r
administrative efficiency are also availa ble a nd a pplicable within
the earmarking framework. :l.;
36

Perhaps the most important aspect of the earmarking process
bearing correctiv~ scrutiny is ~lso the mo~t fundamental - th~t
of matching obtained tax receipts to desired levels of expenditu re. Although this author would not go so far as to call such dis
paritites "distortion" in the earmarking process, he would admit
the necessity of recognizing the non-static nature of the earmarking program which causes them.
One answer would eem to lie in better tax programming
through a careful a nalysis of the elements which determine required levels of spending and, of course, revenue growth in the
earmarking process. In the opinion of this author, such an ac counting would go far to alleviate erratic tax adjustment as well
as reduce this characteristic feature of present day earmarking
practice. A more continuous tax program could also be expected
to reflect a smoother stream of revenues which, in contrast to
the earlier conclusions cited, might well facilitate stability in expenditures and, hence, a more rational system of finance than
might otherwise be achieved. In short, earmarking could appear
to require long-term planning if it is to avoid problematic lags in
rate adjustment resulting from the dynamic evolution of its tax
bases.
A po sible model for achieving this obJecti,e might be an intertemporal goal programming model formulation in which tax
rate become the variable (x), and the tax bases become the matrix coefficients (A). The model would determine a rational tax
program for the agency by calculating those tax rates which minimize the absolut(' error of difference bet ween obtained revenue
(Ax) and desired expenditure target... (t). In matrix notation, the
model b<'come :
Ax t=d++d'.\Iin.

ed+ + ed (ea rov. vector of l's )

Th~ succe s v. hich this author has had in carrying out the compu
tallons for such a model for the California Highway program
would recommend its more general application as a correetive to
the problem~ alluded to above.
Conclusion

The review of contributions by modern writers has revealed
t~at earmarking_ is not without justification or logical application. The two circumstances most favorable to this approach
would appear to be: (1) situation in which a direct relationship
can be found between the consumers of a public good or service
and tho'>e w~o should pay for them and in which a "benefits" sys
tern of taxation eems appropr iate; and (2) situations in which a
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Paret~ super!or tot~! government expenditure ma be a •.
pated if cer t am monies are allocated outside the lecris) t' nltciof t he general fund.
b ' a Ive arena
It
been noted that compartmentalizing the tax funds from
a spec1f1c_ revenue source and dedicating them to a specific function 1s d1squ1etmg to those who would fear a misallocati ·
governmental expenditures. Against this criticism mu~t ~n
placed the arg:ument that, because of t he political context with~
which the dec1s1on-ma_kmg proc~ss is performed, the cooperation
bet ween mt~•rest factions required for a majority gain may not
be lorthrnmmg 1~ general fund budgeting, whereas earmarking
may provide the ideal enforcement tool by which to envelop the
tax and expenditure dec1s1on m the manner necessary to obtain
th<> most desirable conclusion. To this must be added the
Buehanan a_rgument noting the " independence" that earmarking
fo-..ters m d1vorcmg the dedicated account fro m the "tie-in" pro•
pert1e-.. of the general fund a pproach. At least in theory, therefore·. there would appear to be limited situations in which the
rationale for segmenting accounts may be established, thereby
permitting a study of the earmarkmg process as a closed system.

Within this context. the difficulties inherent in the earmarking
function would seem lo be fundamentally a problem of planning,
as noted in the previous discussions of "Stability" and "Control."
The foremost recommendation would be for t he legislature lo
plan a -..chedule of tax rates 1h' hi<'h would time the levels_ of the
revenue program to coincide wit h the expendi~ures requi~ed by
the special agency to fulfill its long term commitments. It 1s contended that the presence of a carefully planned program of expenditures \\ ould then be coupled with a compatible tax ~tructurc which would not only balance the progra~ budget m the
long run but which could be environmentally flex1ble as well.
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